Editorial staff
Sébastien Martin
About the author: Sébastien Martin is CEO of RAID Square and President of the Web3 Security League (LSW3).
___________________________________________________________________
The explosive rise of stablecoins, now the gateway to a new global transactional economy, is quietly reshaping monetary power dynamics — and Europe, once again, seems to be realising the impact far too late. While the United States is capitalising on the dollarisation of Web3 to expand its financial influence, the Old Continent keeps missing key turning points, including in foundational technologies like cloud computing and AI. Europe also struggles to seize opportunities when they arise: if given the chance, the European ambitions of a group like MARA, a global leader in Bitcoin mining, could lay the foundations for a true computing and digital-sovereignty champion. This strategic opening could rebalance the playing field — provided Europe and France finally decide to step in.
Atlantico: Why does the rise of dollar-backed stablecoins represent, in your view, the major geoeconomic upheaval that Europe failed to anticipate?
Sébastian Martin: The advent of stablecoins means that Web3 is becoming dollarised. This means that the entire economy we previously described — where we talked about BTC, Ethereum and other crypto-assets — is starting to change. Emerging uses are creating a new way of paying and transacting. It is no longer just a speculative market or a universe of digital assets but a genuine transactional ecosystem.
This is exactly what the United States has understood. In practice, they are positioning the dollar to capture the volumes flowing into this economy. Historically, the dollar had a physical function. You did not keep it at home – you went to a foreign-exchange bureau and, upon arriving in the United States, deposited euros to get banknotes. Today, whether you are in Paris, Berlin, Savoie, Madrid, a small town near Málaga, or even in Guinea, you can buy dollars through centralised platforms — what we call exchanges — which act as entry points. You deposit your euros and receive dollars, not to spend in New York, but to use locally from your home city through stablecoins.
That is the disruption: the dollarisation of the Web3 economy is underway, and it is happening on a global scale, with no geographical constraints.
Atlantico: Do you believe that dollar stablecoins extend the power of the dollar even more strongly than traditional banking networks like SWIFT or correspondent banking?
Sébastian Martin: What is happening is that SWIFT and all modern international financial infrastructures are preparing their entry into Web3. They are doing so to avoid missing the shift and to remain relevant. But their actions remain framed by very traditional structures, whereas Web3 introduces a far more direct, instantaneous and global model.
To return to the first question about the economic shock Europe failed to foresee: 99% of stablecoin volumes are in dollars. The euro represents only about 0.6% of the remaining flows — and among the rest, there are also initiatives like the dirham attempting to emerge as a stablecoin. This figure is striking, and we must imagine its impact: a global volume of transactions almost entirely concentrated around the dollar.
Another factor strengthening the dollar is that stablecoins are backed by purchases of US Treasury bills, in a context of massive debt, potential shutdowns and vast circulating liquidity. Today, global volumes reach around $310 billion. Compared to the trillions traded on financial markets, that is still relatively modest, but we are at an early stage. With the adoption of the Genius Act, major US institutions — BlackRock, PayPal and others — will repatriate enormous amounts of liquidity through the use of stablecoins. At that point, the ability to concentrate the global economy around the dollar becomes strategic.
Atlantico: Why does Europe once again appear to be underestimating a major technological innovation, as it did with the Internet, cloud computing or AI?
Sébastian Martin: There are several reasons. Europe focused on assets, rightly so, but it has a historical distrust of cryptocurrencies. It focused on assets that, for the vast majority, had no real value, and overlooked those that did. A stablecoin, to put it simply, is a cryptocurrency that enables self-custody: holding it directly, without intermediaries. That is a major technological advantage. But it also has the advantage of a fiat currency, since its price is backed one-to-one by a currency like the dollar. This is what we call the “peg”.
By concentrating on unsafe assets, Europe tried to protect savers by limiting access for “questionable” actors. The United States, meanwhile, took the opposite approach: create stablecoins backed by reliable currencies and build an ecosystem around them, with major issuers like Circle ($60 billion in volume), Tether and a few smaller players. They understood that a new type of financial exchange was emerging and that these volumes needed to be tied to the dollar.
Europe, for its part, bet everything on the digital euro and pinned all its hopes on this project, which still has not taken off. The United States, on the other hand, seized the momentum around stablecoins. This illustrates the contrast between a “cautious” approach and a bold, global strategy.
Atlantico: Olaf Slecht Ben, Governor of the Dutch Central Bank, warns that a run on stablecoins could force the ECB to rethink its monetary policy. To what extent are these tokens becoming an external factor capable of disrupting European monetary sovereignty?
Sébastian Martin: This warning reflects exactly what I was explaining. Current volumes — 310 billion — are still modest, but the growth of use cases and volumes is inevitable, and it is happening in a currency other than the euro. The main concern is that Europe lacks actors capable of issuing stablecoins at scale and providing widespread use cases. We risk missing two waves: the wave of issuance and the wave of innovation around stablecoin applications.
A few initiatives do exist, such as Morpheus, which offers lending and borrowing systems in stablecoins, or certain experimental banks, but they remain limited, often confined to POCs and without critical mass. American players, by contrast, have a structure designed to conquer the global market. They have understood the strategic opportunity: consolidate volume flows and maintain dollarisation. Europe, meanwhile, has not found a solution to “Europeanise” these flows.
Atlantico: If nothing is done, is there a risk that by 2035 or 2050 Europe will lose its monetary autonomy and see its economy become digitally dollarised and dependent on American finance?
Sébastien Martin: If nothing is done, yes, the risk is real. A currency that loses volume often reflects a loss of confidence. The current dollarisation can be seen as a symptom of global anxiety, with actors seeking refuge in the dollar. By 2035, two questions will be crucial:
– Will Europe be able to rebalance volumes and strengthen the use of the euro? – If it fails, how dominant will the dollar become and how much financial flow will it capture?
Every percentage point of volume gained by the dollar represents financial flows lost to Europe. Meanwhile, the United States will benefit from this liquidity to finance its Treasury bills, including through European consumers. American players anticipated this trend. Circle, for example, is regulated in Europe, including in France, but they are leveraging the global momentum to consolidate their position.
The danger for Europe is to remain a spectator while liquidity flows, innovation and use cases concentrate elsewhere.
Editorial staff
